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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
THE A=RICAN MFnicAL ASSOCIATION AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS.*
Is the American Medical Association, or the subsidiary Medical Society of the
District of Columbia, violating the antitrust laws in their opposition to the Group
Health Association? It will be very helpful in discussing the matter, to briefly
outline the salient facts leading up to this problem.
On February 24, 1937, the Group Health Association, Inc., was granted a
charter1 in Washington as a so-called "Co-operative Health" corporation.
Through a staff of hired physicians it offered to render most types of medical
and surgical treatments2 at a stated annual cost;3 and offered such services
only to Federal employees and their families. The Medical Society of the
District of Columbia opposed this new scheme as contravening the best interests
both of the public, and of the physicians, and as violative of its own code
of ethics, as well as the Principles and Ethics of the American Medical Asso-
ciation which represents some 110,000 physicians 4 in this country.
The members of the Medical Society of the District of Columbia knew the
above facts; but several of them, nevertheless, became affiliated with that new
organization. One member 5 was finally expelled after charges were brought
against him in accordance with the rules and regulations of his society. Several
other physicians resigned from the Group Health Association rather than risk
society expulsion.
The newspapers8 took up the issues, pro and con, so that they gradually
became national in their scope; and the discussion finally invaded Congress
early in 1938. 7 Representative Scott s offered a resolution to investigate the
*This article is an analysis of the statement of the Department of Justice, released to
the press August 1, 1938, wherein it was contended that the American Medical Association
and its affiliate, the Medical Society of the District of Columbia, were attempting to
prevent the Group Health Association, of the District of Columbia, from functioning In
violation of the antitrust laws. The views expressed herein are the views of the author.
[Editorial Note.]
1. QuESTIoNs AND ANSWEs ABOUT GROUP HnAITH (1937) § 3, (pamphlet prepared
by Group Health Association, Inc.).
2. By-laws of the Group Health Association (Revised Oct. 25, 1937). Art. X, §§ 1, 4.
To the same effect, see QuEsTONs AND ANswERs ABOUT GROUP HE.AL (1937) § 4.
3. The latest charges are as follows: (a) An application fee of $5 plus $1 for each
dependent. (b) A $10 membership fee, if admitted. (c) Monthly dues of single members
or head of family $2.20; husband or wife $1.80; child dependents under 18, $1; child
dependents 18-21 years (each) $1.00; adult dependents over 21 years (each) $2.20.
A man in a family of four people would therefore have to pay $78.00 during the first
year, and $60.00 per annum thereafter. Besides these charges there is a $25 maternity
charge; a $1.00 house charge for the first visit; there also is a fifty cent additional charge
per visit for treatment of venereal diseases. See QuEsnoNs AND ANSWERS ABOUT GIROUP
HmTH H§ 10-14. See also membership blank of Group Health Association.
4. (1938) 111 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 1194.
6. Washington Post, March 27, 1938, Magazine Section.
6. Ibid. Also newspapers throughout the country have had numerous discussions pro
and con during the past year.
7. Hon. Jed Johnson, 83 CoNo. REc., Feb. 16, 1938, at p. 2803.
8. Hon. Byron Scott, 83 CONG. Rzc., May 3, 1938, at p. 8101.
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antagonistic activities of the Medical Society of the District of Columbia, and
of the parent organization, the American Medical Association.
In July, 1938, in a declaratory judgment, Federal Justice Bailey of the Dis-
trict Court decided9 among other points that the Group Health Association,
Inc. was not practising medicine without a license.
Finally, on August 1, 1938,10 Assistant Attorney-General Thurman Arnold
set forth the position of the Department of Justice. In it, he stated that the
expulsion, or threatened expulsion by the Medical Society of its members for
allying themselves with the Group Health Association, or for having profes-
sional relations with doctors of that organization ".... in effect amounts to
forcing members of the Medical Society to participate in an illegal boycott of
Group Health Association doctors,""-and that the exclusion by Washington
hospitals of physicians who were not members of the Medical Society, (thereby
excluding doctors of the Group Health Association) ". . . may or may not
have amounted to coercion upon them . . . ",12 and that, "In the opinion of
the Department of Justice, this is a violation of the antitrust laws because it
is an attempt on the part of one group of physicians to prevent qualified
doctors from carrying on their calling. . . . The department interprets the law
as prohibiting combinations which prevent others from competing for services
as well as goods."' 3 Some other of his statements will be quoted in the course
of this discussion.
Arnold offered the Medical Society an opportunity to avoid prosecution by
accepting a "consent decree"'14 which they rejected;-hence, on October 17,
1938, the entire matter was placed in the hands of the Federal Grand Jury.'9
Today, the country awaits with great interest the final outcome of this battle
between organized medicine and governmental regulation. While the immediate
matters here involved concern primarily the medical profession and its rela-
tionship to the public, the question ultimately becomes a much broader one. c
The current charges17 squarely raise the question whether the medical associa.
9. Group Health Association, Inc. v. Moor and Pine, U. S. District Court of the
District of Columbia, July 27, 193S.
10. For full statement see leading newspapers of Aug. 1, 1938, and (1938) 111 J. Am.
MED. Ass'N 537. See also mimeograph release of the Department of Justice, signed by
Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney, and approved by Homer Cummings, Attorney
General, July 30, 1938.
11. (1938) 111 J. Amr. MED. Ass'x 537.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. Two other relevant statements might well be included here. In referring
to the Sherman Act he says: "[It] is a means of keeping a competitive situation open Eo
that those who can offer services at less cost are not impeded by agreements, boycotts,
blacklists, expulsions from societies, or organized activities of any character."
He further stated, "No combination or conspiracy can be allowed to limit a doctor's
freedom to arrange his practice as he chooses, so long as by therapeutic standards his
methods are approved and do not violate the law." See id., at 538.
14. See id., at 539.
1S. N. Y. Sun, Oct. 4, 1938, p. 5, col. L
16. Jackson and Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts (1938) 86 U. or PA. L. RPv. 231.
17. N. Y. Sun, Oct. 4, 1938, p. 5, col 1.
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tions are violating the antitrust laws or are acting in restraint of trade.',
At this time several propositions present themselves for discussion:
I. Is the Group Health Association, Inc. illegally practising medicine?
II. Are the actions of the Medical Society of the District of Columbia
a legal and reasonable exercise of the Society's function?10
III. Is medical service such a commodity as to come within the pur-
view of the Sherman 20 and Clayton2 l Acts?
I. Is THE GROUP HEALTH ASSOCIATION, INC. ILLEGALLY PRACTISING
MEDICINE?
The Healing Arts Practise Act of the District of Columbia2 2 provides that
"no person shall practise the healing art in the District of Columbia who is
not (a) licensed to do so. . . ." Let us see whether the Group Health Asso-
ciation, Inc. or any other corporation, is a "person" within the meaning of
this statute.
While a corporation for some purposes is considered legally as a person,-
it is not such a person as can be licensed to practise medicine. A learned
profession can only be practised by one who has been authorized to do so after
an examination as to his knowledge of the subject.24 A corporation, because
of its impersonal and fictitious character, has no mind and cannot think. For
this reason, it cannot meet the educational requirements, nor can it diagnose
a case or prescribe treatment therefor.25 In addition, the practise of the learned
18. (1938) 111 3. Am. MED. Ass'x 537.
19. There are numerous other phases of this organization's activities which wil but
briefly be touched upon.
20. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1927).
21. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 12 et seq. (1927).
22. D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 20, § 122.
23. A corporation is a citizen for the purpose of federal jurisdiction, Doctor v. Harring-
ton, 196 U. S. 579 (1905). But the Supreme Court has decided that a corporation is
not a citizen within the purview of Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution to the effect that:
"the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states." Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868).
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be
deprived of liberty or property without due process of law, has been held to apply to
corporations. United States v. McHie, 194 Fed. 894 (1912). A similar construction has
been placed upon the "due process and equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 (1928). But in Connecticut General Life
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77, 85 (1938), Mr. Justice Black said in his dissenting
opinion: "I do not believe the word 'person' in the Fourteenth Amendment includes
corporations."
In Willmott v. London Road Car. Co. Ltd., [1910J 2 Ch. 525, it was held that a
corporation could be a "respectable and responsible person" within the meaning of a lease
which permitted the lessee to assign it to such a "person."
24. State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N. W. 1078 (1905);
In re Co-operative Law Co., 19. N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910).
25. In State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 43, 103 N. W. 1078, 1079
(1905) it was said: "There was no necessity of legislation to prohibit corporations, as
[Vol. 8
9]COMMENTS
professions involves a confidential relationship. If a corporation were licensed
to practise law or medicine, there would be a dual allegiance because of the
fact that a corporation can only act through its agents and employees,25 who
would owe a duty to the corporation - 7 as well as to the patient -3 or client;3
and such duties in many instances might conflict. If the Group Health
Association, Inc. is practising medicine without a license, which it did not and
cannot obtain, then it is illegally engaged in the practise of that learned
profession.
The statute30 defines the healing art as "the art of detecting or attempting
to detect the presence of any disease; of determining or attempting to deter-
mine the nature and state of any disease if present; of preventing, relieving,
correcting, or curing, or of attempting to prevent, relieve, correct, or cure any
disease.. . ." It is further provided 31 that "to practise means to do or attempt
to do, or to hold one's self out or allow one's self to be held out as ready to
do any act enumerated in subsection (b) of this section ... for a fee, gift, or
reward, whether tangible or intangible.'
The Group Health Association, Inc. is a duly organized corporation- 2 By
its certificate of incorporation and by its by-laws, the corporation may treat
its members and their dependants through hired agents and employees of the
association, for any and all manner of disease and injury. 3 As a matter of
fact the certificate expressly provides3 4 that the Group Health Association, Inc.
is "to provide'.., for the services of physicians and other medical attention
and any and all kinds of medical, surgical and hospital treatment to the
members hereof and their dependants--and, in general, the giving to the
membership of this Association and their dependents of all forms of care,
treatment, or attention that may be required by the sick or in the prevention
of disease." It is further provided 35 that membership "shall be compos ed solely
such, from practicing medicine. It is impossible to conceive of an impeaonal entity . . .
giving or prescribing the application of the remedy of the disease. fembers of the cor-
poration, or persons in its employ might do these things, but the corporation itself is
incapable to do them."
26. "A corporation aggregate being an artificial body . . . is, from its nature, incapable
of doing any act, except thlrough agents... " New York & N. H. It. R. v. Schuyler,
34 N. Y. 30, 50 (1865).
27 REsTATEam=T, AGENC y (1938) § 13.
2S. HEmzoG, NAEnrcAL juwSPRuDoc (1931) § 96.
29. AlEcnsa, OuTrms OF LAw or AOF-NcY (3d ed. 1923) § 616.
30. D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 20, § 121 (b).
31. D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 20, § 121 (c).
32. The corporation was organized under D. C. CoDE (1929) tit. 5, §§ 121 et seq.,
providing for corporations for ". . . benevolent, charitable, educational, liteary, muical,
scientific, religious, or missionary purposes, including societies formed for mutual improve-
ment or fol the promotion of the arts. ."
33. See Certificate of Group Health Association, Inc. art. 3, filed in the office of the
Recorder of Deeds, District of Columbia, on the 24th day of Feb., 1937, and recorded in
Liber 53, folio 556, et seq. Also, BY-Lws or =ra Gnoup HrrTz A- oc, xo:;, I:c.
Art. V, § 5, as revised Oct. 25, 1937 and fled together with the certificate of incorporation.
34. Certificate of Group Health Ass'n, Inc., Art. 3.
35. See id., Art. 4.
1939]
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of employees of any branch of the United States Government other than
officers and enlisted men of the United States Army and Navy," and that
the medical services shall be rendered by licensed doctors and physicians only.80
Does this constitute the practise of medicine by the association? In a recent
decision, 7 Justice Bailey of the United States District Court held that the
Group Health Association, Inc. was not practising medicine. Justice Bailey
justified his decision on the ground that the corporation itself is not prescrib-
ing for the sick, that it only enters into contracts with duly licensed physicians,
who in turn, personally attend and prescribe for the members of the corpora-
tion, and that these physicians are really independent contractors88
It is submitted, however, that both the reasoning and the conclusion of
Justice Bailey are unsound. It is a fundamental rule of law that a corporation
is an entity separate and distinct from its members,89 and that this entity or
fictitious person can only act through its agents and employees. 40 It follows
from this that if the corporation through its agents is rendering medical services,
even though only to its members, it is illegally engaged in the practise of
medicine. That the services rendered to the members and their dependents
are medical in nature is not denied. But it is contended that the corporation is
not personally engaged in the rendition of these services. The physicians are
employed, paid, and discharged by the corporation. These doctors, upon their
appointment, become the employees of the corporation, and, as its agents, they
give medical care and treatment to the Group Health Association's members
and to their dependents. Thus the corporation, acting through these agents,
is in effect giving medical treatment, 4 1-- or, in other words, is engaged in the
practise of medicine. True it is that all the employees of the Group Health
Association, Inc. who act as the corporation's agents in the giving of medical
treatments are licensed physicians. This iact does not change the result since
it is generally recognized that a licensed practitioner of a profession cannot
practise his profession as an employee of an unlicensed person or corporation,
and if he does so, the unlicensed person or corporation is guilty of practising
that profession without a license.4
36. By-Laws of Group Health Ass'n, Inc. (1937) Art. V, § S.
37. See note 10, supra.
38. Ibid.
39. People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439, 61 S. E. 794 (1908). Here
it was held that a corporation composed entirely of negroes was not a colored person.
See SmvENs, CoapoAnoxs (1936) § 1.
40. See note 27, supra.
41. In People, by Kerner v. United Medical Service, Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N. E. 157
(1936), it was held that a corporation's ownership of a medical clinic with offices in which
patients were treated solely by licensed and registered physicians employed by the cor-
poration, and which received the fees charged the patients, constituted the practice of
medicine by the corporation within the meaning of a statute that prohibited such practice
except by licensed persons. People v. Woodbury Dermatological Inst., 192 N. Y. 454,
85 N. E. 697 (1908); State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 234 N. W. 260 (1931)
(practice of dentistry); Godfrey v. Medical Society of the County of N. Y., 177 App.
Div. 684, 164 N. Y. Supp. 846 (2d Dep't 1917).
42. See note 42, supra. McMurdo v. Getter, 10 N. E. (2d) 139 (Mass. 1937); cf.
(Vol. 8
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Even if we concede that Justice Bailey was correct in his contention that
the physicians employed by the Group Health Association, Inc. are independent
contractors rather than the agents of the corporation, this corporation could
not legally manage or conduct the "business side" of the practice. This is so
because the law does not pretend to divide the practice of a profession into
departments, on one side the actual performance of the professional services-
and on the other the business side.4 3 The practise of a profession is treated
as a whole, since the courts do not wish to open it to commercial exploitation
which certainly would be its fate if corporations were permitted to practise
it. Thus, the practise of medicine by the Group Health Association cannot
be upheld on the ground that it merely manages, conducts, and controls the
business side, and that licensed men are employed to do the actual work.
This leads us to disagree with Justice Bailey's decision as being unsound
and against public policy. Were the courts to adopt his ruling, it would follow
that an unlicensed person either natural or corporate could own the equipment
and be master of the situation by hiring licensed men to do the work. This
is not the object and policy of our law.
I. ARE = AcTIoNs OF = MEDICAL SocITY OF THE DxsTvzcr or
COLUMBIA A LEGAL AND REASONABLE EXERCIsE OF
THE SociET''s FuNcT oN?
Chapter III, Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the Code of Ethics of the American Medical
Association states:
"In order that the dignity and honor of the Medical profession may be upheld, its
standards exalted... and the advancement of medical science promoted, a physician
should associate himself with medical societies . . . in order that these societies
may represent the ideals of the profession."
Here we have concrete evidence that every physician is urged to join his
In re Co-operative Law Co, 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910), wherein it was held that
a coporation cannot practice law through lawyers employed by it, and therefore cannot
enforce a lien for legal services. Contra: State Electro-Medical Institute v. Plantner,
74 Neb. 23, 103 N. W. 1079 (1905).
43. In Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 235, 14 P. (2d) 67 (1932),
it was held that a corporation or an unlicensed person may not manage, conduct, or con-
trol the "business side of the practice of dentistry."
It is to be noted that, if such a division were possible, then the corporation or the
non-licensed individual could be guilty of gross misconduct, and could violate all standards
which a licensed physician would be required to respect, and yet would remain immune
from any regulatory supervision whatsoever. That a member of a profec-son is subject
to this regulatory supervision of the state, see People ex rcl. Karlin v. Cull'in, 243 N. Y.
465, 162 N. E. 437 (1923), which held that the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
had power to inquire into the conduct of its officers (the members of the bar), and to
punish any of them for "ambulance chasing."
44. The practice of a profession is subject to licensing and refulation and is not
subject to commercialization or exploitation. Parker v. Board of Dental Examiner, 216
Cal. 285, 14 P. (2d) 67 (1932); Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 360 IM. 36s, 196
N. E. 799 (1935).
1939]
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local medical society. Usually the only requirement for admission to a county
medical society is that the proposed member be a licensed physician, of good
moral character, 45 and that he reside, or practise in the county where he seeks
admissiorl. In most instances there are no restrictive qualifications of any
kind, so that any physician can become a member without difficulty.4"
But when a physician47 does join a medical society, it has very constantly
been held that the rules and by-laws of the society are an agreement which
he expressly or impliedly accepts, 48 and by which he agrees to govern his
professional conduct. Legally, 49 it makes no difference how selfish or unselfish
these society rules and by-laws may be; so long as they do not violate any
laws of the land, are not against public policy," and are a legitimate pro-
tection5' of the interests of the members of the society, they are binding upon
each member.
A society's only means of keeping erring members in line are censure, sus-
pension, and expulsion.5 2  These weapons are legally recognized checks on
straying members, and can only be used against individuals after charges have
been preferred against them.
The only requirements" which the law demands of a society are: (a) that
45. A typical rule for membership is that of the Bronx County Medical Society:
"Physicians in good moral and professional standing, residing or having an office In
Bronx County, duly licensed and recorded in the office of the County Clerk of Bronx
Co. . .. are eligible for active membership in the Bronx County Medical Society, the First
District Branch of the Medical Society of the State of New York, and of the American
Medical Association. . . ." By-Laws, as amended Jan. 7, 1926, § 3.
46. People cx rel. Bartlett v. Medical Society, 32 N. Y. 184 (1865). Where a physician
has the necessary qualifications he cannot be refused admission to the society, even If he
violated some ethical principles before admission, because such society rules are only bind-
ing upon members,
47. Reid v. Medical Soc. of Oneida Co., 156 N. Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd,
177 App. Div. 939, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1129 (3d Dep't 1917); Ewald v. Medical Society of
County of N. Y., 144 App. Div. 82, 128 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1st Dep't 1911).
48. Miller v. Hennepin Co. Med. Soc., 124 Minn. 314, 144 N. WV. 1091 (1914); Brown
v. Harris Co. Med. Soc., 194 S. W. 1179 (Tex Civ. App. 1917); Porter v. King Co. Med.
Soc., 58 P. (2d) 367 (Wash. 1936).
49. Porter v. King Co. Med. Soc., 58 P. (2d) 367 (Wash. 1936); Gregg v. Mass. Med.
Soc., 111 Mass. 185 (1872) semble.
50. State ex rel. Waring v. Georgia Med. Soc., 38 Ga. 608 (1869). But where a
member is ousted for violation of rules which themselves are against public policy e.g.
offering to be a surety for a colored public officer, the courts will interfere, and reinstate
such member wrongfully ousted.
51. See note 53, infra. It is to be noted that the rules for medical societies also hold
generally for other voluntary societies, unions, and associations. Thus see Cohn & Roth
Elec. Co. v. Bricklayer's etc. Local Un. No. 1, 92 Conn. 161, 101 AtI. 659 (1917); Booker
& Kinnaird v. Louisville B'd. of Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771, 224 S. W. 451 (1920)
(association) ; see note 78, infra.
52. Porter v. King Co. Med. Soc., 58 P. (2d) 367 (Wash. 1936).
53. Gregg v. Massachusetts Med. Soc., 111 Mass. 185 (1872); Miller v. Hennepin Co.
Med. Soc., 124 Minn. 314, 144 N. W. 1091; Brown v. Harris Co. Med. Soc., 194 S. W.
1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). People ex rel. Wilson v. Med. Soc. of Dutchess Co., 84 Hun
448 (N. Y. 1895).
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the member receive adequate notice of the charges to be brought against him; 5'
(b) that the charges be violations of the rules and regulations of the society;
(c) that the accused be given a fair hearing on these charges.
If the hearing is held in good faith,r5 since the courts consider it quasi-
judicial in character, they have consistently refused to pass on the final verdict
of the society. 6
In the incidents which led up to Thurman Arnold's statement, several phy-
sicians became professionally affiliated with the Group Health Association, Inc.
As early as October 2, 1937, and before this association had actively com-
menced to function, an excellent article5 7 appeared in the Journal of the
American Medical Association, which analyzed the set-up of this new organ-
ization. The writer of the article pointed out among other things, that that
organization was in all likelihood practising medicine illegally;59 that the
physicians employed were primarily agents of the association rather than of
the patient;5 9 that the by-laws of the association expressly provided c5 that
"The Medical Director shall render such reports as the Board of Trustees
shall require. . ." which thereby would tend to abolish all privacy and secrecy
between 1 physician and patient; that there was absolutely no freedom of
choice by the patient of his physician; 62 and that undoubtedly such physicians
who became attached to that organization would be looked on .. as on the
outer verge of ethical practise, if not altogether beyond the pale. .... 113
That the physicians who allied themselves with the Group Health Associa-
tion thereby violated some of the most cardinal rules of their medical organ-
ization is unquestioned. It is illuminating to examine some of these rules.
54. A typical rule regarding disciplinary measures against any member of a society is:
'"A three quarter vote of the members and fellows present shall be nccenary to expel a
member. ... A vote to expel a member . . . shall not be taken unles the printcd call
for the meeting contains a notice of the proposal to expel, and the accused s-all have
been duly notified by registered mail at least one week previously at h13 last given
address. . ." Charter and By-Laws, N. Y. Academy of ledicine (1933) Art. LX, § 2.
55. In Brown v. Harris Co. led. Soc., 194 S. W. 1179, 11SO (Ten. Civ. App. 1917),
we have, well summarized, the holding of most courts on case of this character. "The
decisions of any kind of voluntary society or association in admitting members and in
disciplining, suspending, or expelling them, are of a quasi-public character and in such
cases the courts never interfere except to ascertain whether or not the procecding was
pursuant to the rule and laws of the society, whether it was in good faith, and vhethcr
or not there was anything in it in violation of the laws of the land. If the proceeding
was fairly had, in good faith and pursuant to the laws of the society, and if there was
nothing in it in violation of the laws of the land, then the sentence is conclusive lihe
that of a judicial tribunal. . . ." See note 74, infra.
56. State ex rel. Waring v. Georgia Bled. Soc., 38 Ga. 603 (1569). Se note $0, supra.
57. Group Health Association, Inc. (1937) 109 J. Aas. Dm. Ass':z. 39B.
53. See id., at 41B.
59. See id., at 44B.
60. By-Laws of Group Health Association Inc. (1937) Art. V, § 6.
61. Group Health Association, Inc. (1937) 109 J. Amx Man. Ass'.a. 44B.
62. Id. at 45B.
63. Id. at 45B, 46B.
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Chapter II, Art. 1, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the Medical Society of the
District of Columbia states: "The principles of Medical Ethics of the American
Medical Association shall be binding upon the members of the society. .... .
Again Article 3, Sec. 1 of the same chapter, after embodying Chapter III, Art.
6, Sec. 2 of the Principle of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Associa-
tion, 64 then continues: "No member of the society shall enter into a writ-
ten, verbal or implied contract or agreement with any person, firm, cor-
poration, association . . . the terms of which contract or agreement are in
violation of the principles herein expressed. . . ." Incidentally, it is noteworthy
that the condemnation6 5 of medical practices "which interfere with reasonable
competition among the physicians of the community . . ." to say the least,
seems paradoxical with Arnold's accusation of "monopoly" and "restraint of
trade".
One other clause of the Constitution of the Medical Society of the District
of Columbia is important at this time. Chapter IX, Article 1, Sec. 3 reads:
"All duties . . . and regulations as to their professional conduct . . . which shall
be imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of this Society . . . shall be binding
and mandatory upon all members, and for violation thereof they shall be subject
to discipline by the Society."
The District of Columbia Medical Society also demands of each member
within three months after his election to membership, 0 a written consent to
be bound by all the rules and regulations of the Society.
It is thus apparent that every member of that Society is actually put on
notice, shortly after joining, that there are such things as rules and regulations,
Constitution and By-Laws, which he expressly agrees to abide by and adhere to.
Furthermore, most active members of the medical societies of this country
subscribe to its official magazine, the Journal of the American Medical Asso-
ciation. It is reasonable to suppose that a physician who contemplated allying
himself with Group Health Association, Inc., should have read the article
concerning that association.67 Had he done so he would have known that
such misalliance would doubtless be deemed unethical, 8 in that, in the opinion
of the Medical Association, that society violates most of the cardinal principles
of medical ethics.
There are two fairly recent cases very much in point with the facts here
under discussion. In Irwin v. Lorio,69 the Parish Medical Society expelled
three doctors for serving as physicians to the Standard Oil Employee's Medical
and Hospital Association on the ground that such service was unethical and
64. "It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his services under conditions
that make it impossible to render adequate services to his patient or which interfere with
reasonable competition among physicians of a community. To do this is detrimental to
the public. . ." (Italics inserted.)
65. See note 68, infra.
66. By-laws, Medical Soc. Dist. of Columbia, c. IX, art. 1, § 4.
67. Group Health Assn. Inc. (1937) 109 J. Am. Mm. Ass'N 39B.
68. See id., at 45B, 46B.
69. 169 La. 1090, 126 So. 668 (1930).
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violated several important principles of the Code of Ethics of that Society,
and of the American Medical Association. The court held that the Parish
Medical Society had the power to suspend and expel its members for legal
cause, after a fair hearing; that so long as the proceeding was held in good
faith, pursuant to the rules and by-laws of the Society; and so long as the
rules were not in violation of the laws of the land, the decision of the Society
would then be conclusive upon the court. Furthermore, no courts would
interfere70 at the instance of an aggrieved member until he had exhausted all
remedies afforded him by the Constitution or By-Laws of the society; or
unless he showed a good excuse for not having done so.
In Porter v. Kings County Medical Society,71 two physicians, who had been
members of their local medical society, had engaged in a form of contract
and group practise which violated the rules and regulations of their society
(in much the same way as in the previous case). The men were expelled after
a fair hearing of their case. It was held that the Society's Constitution,
Charter and By-Laws constitute a contract between the members enforceable
by the courts unless immoral, or contrary to the law of the land or to public
policy. The court also held that whether the by-laws which were violated
were just, reasonable, or wise was a question of policy concerning only the
society and its members.
These two cases are squarely in point with the facts involved in the Wash-
ington dismissal, upon which Arnold later built his "restraint of trade" charge.
The holding of the courts in these cases, as well as in so many other related
cases involving not only medical societies, but also other voluntary societies,
associations,72 unions,73 etc. have consistently been the same, and would dearly
seem to exonerate such societies from any suggestion of illegal coercion, or
restraint.7 4
70. Gregg v. Mass. Med. Soc., 111 Mass. 185 (1872); MIller v. Hennepin Co. Led.
Soc., 124 Minn. 314, 144 N. W. 1091 (1914); People ex rel. Wilson v. led. Soc. Dutcbez
Co., 84 Hun 448 (N. Y. 1895); Ewald v. Med, Soc. of Co. of N. Y., 144 App. Div. 82,
128 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1st Dep't 1911); Reid v. Med. Soc. of Oneida Co., 156 N. Y. Supp.
780 (Sup. CL 1915), aff'd 177 App. Div. 939 (3d Dep't 1917); Porter v. King, 58 P. (2d)
367 (Wash. 1936). In Brown v. Harris Co. led. Soc., 194 S. W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917) the court held that if the member was tried in violation of society rules and by-
laws, equity would then interfere and set aside the society verdict.
71. 58 P. (2d) 367 (Wash. 1936).
72. Booker & Kinnaird v. Louisville B'd. of Fire Underwriters, 183 Ky. 771, 224 S. W.
451 (1920); Harelson v. Tyler, 281 Mo. 383, 219 S. W. 903 (1920). A hay deals'
association which fines, suspends, or expels members for violation of its by-laws is not
unlawful under the common law.
73. "The enforcing of a by-law forbidding members of the union to serve one vho
breaks a contract with its members does not amount to intimidation.. ." Seymour Ruff
& Son Inc. v. Bricklayer's etc. Union, 163 Md. 687, 700, 164 At. 752, 757 (1933); sEm
Cohn & Roth Elec. Co. v. Bricklayers' etc. Local Un. No. 1, 92 Conn. 161, 166, 101 Ad.
659, 661 (1917).
74. "n almost every profession and every business there are asciations... organizcd
by persons engaged in particular lines of industry or following certain profession, that
have for their sole purposes the protection and promotion of the best intere-t of the
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Group Insurance, Contract Practise and the Group Health Association.
It is very important at this point to digress slightly from our main theme
and call attention to the fact that under the Code of Medical Ethics, Contract
Practise per se is not considered unethical.7 It is only deemed so when certain
objectionable features or conditions exist in the contract, among which are
the following: "1. When there is solicitation of patients directly or indirectly.
... 4. When there is interference with reasonable competition in a community.
5. When free choice of a physician is prevented. .... .
Does the Group Health Association, Inc. violate these rules? It is almost
superfluous to state that that organization violates every one of the above
rules. Thus, it solicited for membership among the Federal employees of
Washington, and is still doing so.76 It is a fundamental principle that ethical
physicians may not do this; there is no such restraint, however, on a lay
organization, which is governed by the ordinary rules and methods of business.
That that organization interferes with reasonable competition among physi-
cians in the vicinity is fairly obvious. The associatioti originally was supposed
to serve only 2,500 persons. By June 15, 1938, 77 it already had on its roster
2,568 paying members, and a total of over 6,000 persons entitled to medical
service, and was still expecting to expand. 78 When we stop to realize that the
membership is composed of Federal employees, that no high income bracket is
debarred from joining, that there is no proof that any or most of these indi-
viduals are, of a class unable to meet medical expenses, we can readily appre-
ciate how many patients are thus withdrawn from the legitimate clientele of
the physicians of Washington and the environs, and thrust upon the physicians
and specialists"9 affiliated with that organization."
Finally, we come to the matter of "free choice of physicians" of which there
is none.81 The members are limited to the use of the association doctors,82
with the possible exception of an occasional outside consultant. Hence, it is
business or profession in which they are engaged. And bodies like these ...may ...
when their interests demand it, refuse to deal with . . .any other person or persons they
choose, although the effect of such combined action is to boycott the objectionable person
very much in the same way as the boycott was in effect in this case against Booker &
Kinnaird. . . ." Booker & Kinnaird v. Louisville Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771,
783, 224 S. W. 451, 455 (1920).
75. PINciPLus oF MEDicAL Eamcs OF THE AmxxcAIN MmrxcAL Ass'u (1938), c. III,
art. 5, § 3.
76. Group Health Ass'n Inc. (1937) 109 J. Am. MED. Ass'x 39B.
77. QUEsToIs AND ANswEs Aor GROUP HEALT (1937) i 7.
78. "'The membership will be increased to 3,300 immediately. It is anticipated that as
rapidly as additional clinical facilities and competent physicians can be provided for, new
members will be added." Id., at § 37. It is to be noted that for every paying member
there are approximately two and a half individuals entitled to treatment. Thus where
there were 2,568 paying members, over 6,000 individuals were entitled to medical service.
79. See id., at § 9.
80. Group Health Ass'n Inc. (1937) 109 J. Amr. A m. Ass' 46B. Also see QuEsTIoNs AND
ANSWxS ABOUT GROUP HEALTH (1937) § 9.
81. Group Health Ass'n Inc. (1937) 109 J. Am. ME. Ass'N 45B.
82. By-Laws of Group Health Ass'n, Inc. (1937) art. X, sec. 4.
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interesting to note that Assistant Attorney General Arnold,ra in his statement
to the press, used the phrase "physician of their own choice" concerning mem-
hers of the Group Health Association. When we consider that 6,000 or more
members entitled to medical and surgical treatment have a "choice" of but
two surgeons, one baby specialist, two general practitioners, one urologist
(genito-urinary specialist), and one obstetrician, the phrase becomes almost
ridiculous 84
The matter of free choice of physicians is a very important one. It is con-
stantly sought for by the American Medical Association when analyzing any
new medical schemes and projects which may be advanced. This is not only
demanded for the protection of the medical profession as a whole, but is more
particularly stressed for the welfare of the public,80 to permit them at all times
to use a physician of their own choice-one in whom they have confidence
and trust;-one who in most instances has been tried out in the past and not
found wanting;--one who they know in advance will in every way protect
their interests and retain their confidence. To have a physician who is pri-
marily an agent of an association, corporation, or other third person,80 rather
than the agent of his patient, violates one of the most basic and time honored
canons of medical ethics, i. e. secrecy or privacy87 It violates the law of
most communities as well.88
While the American Medical Association has objected to "group or contract
practise" as illustrated by the Group Health Association, they do not object
to the group insurance idea for payment of medical bills8 2 Under approved
83. (1938) 111 J. Am. IEDf. Ass'-N 537.
84. QuEsrioNs AND ANsws Aour GRoup HLT (1937) § 9.
85. (1938) 111 J. Am. Alm. Ass'N 1194. Among the ten principles adopted by the
American Medical Association in 1934, the third one states, "Patients must have absolute
freedom to choose a legally qualified doctor of medicine. . . ." 16 BULL= or Bno,.
Co. Am. Soc. (1938) 139.
86. In 16 BuLLEL-n OF BRoNx Co. MIre. Soc. (1938) 139, the second principle reads:
"No third party must be permitted to come between the patient and his physcian in any
medical relation."
87. Principle No. 4: "The method of giving the service must retain a permanent, con-
fidential relation between the patient and a 'family physician'. This relation must be the
fundamental and dominant feature of any system." Ibid.
Also PR=CIPLE or ]Mfoic.Ar, Ermcs (1938) c. II § 1. "The confidences concerning
individual or domestic life entrusted by a patient to a physician and the defects of dis-
position or flaws of character observed in patients during medical attendance should be
held as a trust and should never be revealed except when imperatively required by the
laws of the state."
88. N. Y. Civ. PRAcT. Acr (1920) § 352. "A person duly authorized to practice physc
or surgery, ...shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in
attending a patient in a professional capacity... .'
89. (1938) 111 J. Am. m. Ass'N 1194; 16 Burani or T= Bno:x Co. Mm. So.
(1938) 139. The sixth principle states: "However the cost of medical services may be
distributed, the immediate cost should be borne by the patient if able to pay at the time
the service is rendered." See also (1938) 111 J. Am. ED. Ass':.; 1216 wherein the follow,-
ing recommendation is reported as having been made on a general program of medical
care: "In addition to insurance for hospitalization your committee believes it is practicable
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plans a patient at all times has a free choice of his physician, from among
all the physicians of the community, county or city, depending on the radius
covered by any particular plan.90
As typical examples of such arrangements we have the now very familiar,
highly successful, Group Hospitalization Plan found all over the country in
one form or another. The choice of the hospital under this plan is left entirely
to the patient and his physician, 91 and in large cities most of the better private
institutions are members of this plan. That the service has made rapid strides
to extreme popularity with the public is indisputable. 92 The rates are also
very reasonable in view of the benefits offered by this plan.
3
Group Hospitalization Insurance is an excellent example of a non-govern-
mental, privately subscribed "group-payment" plan for adequate hospital ser-
vice, with free choice of hospitals.
A now familiar example of "group-insurance" payment for medical service
is found very close to home, namely, under the New York State Workmen's
Compensation Law. Prior to July 1, 1935, the duty of the employer was to
render adequate medical, surgical, hospital, or other necessary treatment to
his injured employee. 9 4 Either the employer or the insurance carrier had the
right-which they frequently exercised-of ordering an injured employee to
a doctor of their own choice., The result was that there was a good deal of
"racketeering" in industrial work, particularly by men who specialized in this
form of practise. Many of these physicians and Compensation Clinics engaged
paid solicitors, bribed carrier's clerks, and used other modern "business methods"
to obtain an increased volume of work.
But with the help and advice of the New York State Medical Society,
Chapter 258, Sec. 13 of the Laws of New York was written and became
effective July 1, 1935. 95 This provided for the selection by employee of his
own physician when he was hurt. Today the employee alone, except in certain
unusual instances, has complete freedom of choice of a physician from among
to develop cash indemnity insurance plans to cover, in whole or in part, the costs of
emergency or prolonged illness."
90. 16 BULLETIN OF THE BRONX CO. MED. SOC. (1938) 139, the eighth principle reads:
"Any-form of medical service should include within its scope all legally qualified doctors of
medicine of the locality covered by its operation who wish to give service under the
conditions established."
91. "A subscriber should be free to choose his hospital at the time of illness." Rorem,
Approved List of Hospital Care Insurance Plans (May 1938) HOspiTALs.
When a member of the "plan" is travelling and requires hospitalization for any emer-
gency illness or accident, or if for any reason he chooses a non-member hospital while
at home, the "plan" makes its usual per-diem allowance to defray his hospital expense.
92. Ibid. "These plans [on Apr. 18] reported a total enrollment of 1,600,000 employed
persons on April 1, 1938, as compared with 800,000 one year ago, 300,000 in 1936, and
75,000 in 1935."
93. Single individual $10 per annum; married couple $19 per annum; family with all
dependents under 18 years of age $24 per annum.
94. Chap. 553 Sec. 13 of the Laws of New York (1927).
95. These provisions were amendatory of the existing compensation laws and designed
to remedy its evils.
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any who are authorized by the Industrial Commissioner to treat compensation
cases. Any physician may be so empowered by applying to his local medical
society.
The new law has worked out beneficially both for the family physician who
treats the same patient for all his other ailments, and for the patient who need
no longer be ordered to go to a doctor whom he does not know, or in whom
he may have little or no confidence.
At this time many medical societies in various parts of the country are
working on the "group-insurance" plan for payment of medical servicesY0
This plan is very similar to the Group Hospitalization plan and the New
York Workmen's Compensation plan. The patient calls his own physician
during any medical or surgical illness; professional services are rendered to
the patient, but the bill is sent to the insurer. The fundamental differences
between this plan and the Group Health Association plan are: first, that in
the new plan sponsored by the Medical Societies of the various communities,
the time honored relationship between physician and patient remains inviolate;
and secondly, that the patient at all times has complete freedom of choice of
his doctor.
This plan undoubtedly will meet with the whole-hearted approval of the
public in the same manner that the Group Hospitalization plan has become
so extremely and deservedly popular during its brief existence. That it also
has the whole-hearted support of the medical profession is well evidenced by
the fact that when details of the plan were sent out by the Kings County
Medical Society (Brooklyn, New York) and each physician was asked to check
off "interested" or "not interested", only 4 out of 1987 replied in the negative T
III. Is MEDICAL SERVICE SUCH A CO=rODITY AS TO CO=n NVITHl1 m
PURVIEW OF THE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON AcTs?03
In order to discuss this phase of the question more intelligently, it will
be helpful to again quote several of the condemnatory portions of Arnold's
official statement and then to compare them with the statutes, and with the
doctrine of stare decisis.
Arnold in referring to the expulsion, or threatened expulsion of physicians
by the Medical Society for their affiliation with the Group Health Association
says:
"In the opinion of the Department of Justice this is a violation of the antitrust
96. N. Y. Sun, Oct. 12, 1938, p. 17, col 6 (Cincinnati Academy of Medicine). Sim-
ilarly see N. Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1933, p. 19, col. 2, reporting that "A sweeping plan for
providing medical care of every type, surgery and specialiation included . .. is baing
developed for application to sixteen counties of New York next year." Also see (1937)
109 J. Am. MAbm. Ass'x 49B-50B, concerning British Group Insurance plan, and a Canadian
experiment along similar lines.
97. (Oct. 1938) BuLL=m K=Gcs Co. Mm. Soc.
93. Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1590), 15 U. S. C. § 1 ef seq. (1927); Clayton Act,
3S STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 12 et seq. (1927); Hepburn Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914),
15 U. S. C. § 45 et seq. (1927).
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laws. . . . The department interprets the law as prohibiting combinations which
prevent others from competing for services as well as goods. .... 09
"... The Sherman Act is not a method of directing or planning the future; in-
stead it is a means of keeping a competitive situation open so that those who can
offer services at less cost are not impeded by agreements, boycotts, blacklists, ex-
pulsions from societies, or organized activities of any character. .... 100
"No combination or conspiracy' 01 can be allowed to limit a doctor's freedom
to arrange his practice as he chooses ... .
With these main excerpts in mind, let us now examine the antitrust laws,
to see whether or not they can possibly relate to medical services.
Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act-'10 reads as follows:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations is
declared to be illegal.".
From this statement of the law, it can readily be seen that almost any
contract, or combination relating to trade or commerce, and interstate in
character, whether legitimate, reasonable or otherwise, can easily be held to
be in restraint of trade.10 4
At first the Supreme Court did in fact construe the statute strictly in
accordance with the Common Law,10 5 and held that all contracts, combinations,
or agreements, which created or tended to create a monopoly, whether reason-
able or unreasonable, were unlawful because they were in restraint of trade
and therefore against public policy.
After a short time the Supreme Court commenced to modify its views, so
that in the Joint Traffic Case °8 in 1898, they decided that a restraint of trade,
to be violative of Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act,10 7 had to be direct and sub-
stantial; and not indirect, remote and incidental; 08 and that the antitrust
99. (1938) 111 J. Am. MED. Ass'N. 537.
100. See id., at 538.
101. See definition of conspiracy in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443, 465 (1920).
102. (1938) 111 J. Am. Mm . Ass'N. 537.
103. See note 97, supra.
104. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505, 568 (1898). (The effect on
interstate commerce must not be indirect or incidental only, but must be direct and
immediate in its effect on interstate commerce); In Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S.
578, 600 (1898) the court said: "The act of Congress must have a reasonable construction
or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract among business men which could
not be said to have, indirectly or 'remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and
possibly to restrain it... .
105. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290 (1897); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U. S. 211 (1899); Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
106. See note 104, supra.
107. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1927).
108. Accord: United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922);
United Leather Workers' International Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S.
457 (1924); Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U. S. 64 (1925);
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act required a "reasonable construction". 10 9 This holding was but a short
step from the "rule of reason" doctrine which was promulgated in 1910 and
1911 in the celebrated Tobacco"0 and Standard Oil Cases.'1 ' In these cases
the Supreme Court decided that there must be a "resort to reason" in con-
struing what constituted "restraint of trade". They held that only such
contracts and combinations which "unduly" restricted competition, or "unduly"
obstructed the due course of trade, were to be held violative of the antitrust
laws. 1
2
From that time on the holding as to restraints of trade gradually became
more and more liberal. Thus, in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 13
although there was a good deal of violence and bloodshed, the Court held that
any restraint of trade present was merely secondary and incidental to the
primary purpose of the strikers, which was to protect their legitimate interests
and prevent an open shop; and that these serious trespasses were not part of
any conspiracy under the antitrust laws.
Let us now carefully examine Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act. We note that
the contract, combination or conspiracy must be in restraint of "trade" or
"commerce"; and it must furthermore be "among the several states" i. e. inter-
state, to be illegal.
What is "trade" and "commerce"? Many of the cases have resorted to the
dictionary for the definition of these two terms. Typical of most of these
definitions is that given in the Metropolitan Opera Company v. Hammer-
steinj 4
Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammerstein, 162 App. Div. 691, 693 (let Dept. 1914),
aff'd, 221 N. Y. 507 (1917).
109. See note 103, supra.
110. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 105 (1911).
111. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
112. In Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, supra, dealers in building
material formed a protective association to offset the oppression of the labor unions and
used methods pursuasive and coercive. Held: such interference with commerce was
primarily local and only secondarily interstate, and the means used did not unduly
obstruct free flow of interstate commerce. Accord: Eastern States Lumber A-c'n v.
United States, 234 U. S. 600, 613 (1914); American Column Co. v. United State , 257
U. S. 377, 400 (1921).
113. 259 U. S. 344 (1921); also United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457
(1924); Contra: Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522 (1915). This case was decided before
the passage of the Clayton Act, and was a rather severe blow to labor organizations since
it held them guilty of restraint of trade.
Similarly in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1920) decided shortly
after the passage of the Clayton Act; it also held labor organizations in restraint of trade.
But see a strong dissenting opinion by Brandeis, J., in that case (note 122, infra) which
was a forerunner of much more liberal subsequent opinions; e.g. the two previous cases
cited supra.
114. 162 App. Div. 691, 694, 147 N. Y. Supp. 532, 534 (1st Dept 1914), a'd, 221 N. Y.
507 (1917) ; other definitions of "trade" and "commerce" see American League Baseball Club
v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 459, 149 N. Y. Supp. 6, 16 (Sup. Ct. 1914) (at page 17: "Baseball
... is not a commodity or article of commerce. . .. ") ; Matter of Oriental Society, 104
Fed. 975 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1900) (giving of theatrical performances is not trading or
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".. . Webster defines 'trade' as 'the act or business of exchanging commodities by
barter; . . . commerce, traffic, barter.' 'Commerce' is defined as 'the exchange of
merchandise on a large scale between different places or communities; extended trade
or traffic.' The Standard Dictionary defines 'commerce' as 'the exchange of goods,
production of property of any kind, especially on a large scale between states and
nations'. .. ."
In United States v. Swift & Company,'" the Court says: "Commerce, briefly
stated, is the sale or exchange of commodities....
From these definitions we note that reference is made to goods, to mer-
chandise, to articles of barter, to commodities. What is a commodity? A
typical definition may be quoted from American League Baseball Club oJ
Chicago v. Chase."16
"A commodity is defined as particularly an article of merchandise; anything movable
which is a subject of trade or of acquisition. .. ."
Is labor a commodity? The Clayton Act"17 passed in 1914 definitely stated
that labor was not a commodity or article of commerce. The vast majority
of cases prior to the enactment of that law had consistently held the same
view. Section 17118 of that act also decreed to labor, agriculture, and horti-
culture the right to form organizations for mutual help and assistance; that
section" 9 also decreed that such combinations were not to be deemed violative
of any antitrust laws; nor were they to be considered in restraint of trade.
Sec. 20 of that Act forbade the issuance of injunctions against employees who
strike or who persuade others to peacefully do the same.
Labor had been contending for such a law for many years and its passage
following mercantile pursuits). Accord: People v. Klaw, 55 Misc. 72, 106 N. Y. Supp. 341
(County Ct. 1907); Harms v. Cohen, 297 Fed. 276 (D. C. Pa. 1922) (a musical composition
under a copyright is not trade or commerce).
115. 122 Fed. 529, 531 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1903).
116. 86 Misc. 441, 149 N. Y. Supp. 6, 16 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
117. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 12 et seq. (1927) § 17. "The Labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce .... " State v. Frank, 114 Ark.
47, 169 S. W. 333 (1914) (laundering is not a commodity). Accord: Downing v. Lewis,
56 Neb. 386, 76 N. W. 900 (1898). In Harelson v. Tyler, 281 Mo. 383, 389, 219 S, W.
908, 913 (1920), it was said: "Labor, whether physical or intellectual, or a combination of
the two, is not by any fair result of construction a 'product or commodity' ... within the
meaning of the word as used in the statute .... " State cx rel. Star Pub. Co. v. Associated
Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60 S. W. 91 (1900) (getting news is not a commodity).
118. " .. .Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and. operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations Instituted for
the purpose of mutual help . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof. ... 
In Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa 182, 184, 118 N. W. 276, 278 (1908), the court said:
...It is the right of miners, artisans, laborers, or professional men to unite for their
own improvement or advancement or for any other lawful purpose, and it has never been
held, so far as we are able to discover, that aunion for the purpose of advancing wages Is
unlawful under any statutes which have been called to our attention. .... .
119. " . . . nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to
be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
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was particularly welcome to them after some severe adverse decisions had
been rendered against them, particularly in the celebrated Danbury Hailer' s
case. 2 0 Despite the passage of the Clayton Act' 2 ' the Duplex v. Decring
case' 22 coming on shortly after the enactment of the Clayton Act, gave a deci-
sion adverse to labor on the ground that unlawful means had been used to
restrain interstate trade. Thereafter the decisions toward labor, and labor
organizations, were much more liberal; so that in some casesLas where the
facts involved more decided instances of restraint of trade through the use
of force and violence, the Supreme Court nevertheless decided that such re-
straint was incidental and secondary to some other more primary purposesi-
hence, not violative of the antitrust laws.
Where does medical service fit into this picture? Is medical service labor?
Is it a commodity of trade or commerce? Is medical practise to be considered
as being interstate in character? It is, of course, difficult to find many cases
which answer these questions precisely. In Roii v,. Kascnzeier 24 we have a
direct answer to our question. That case squarely held that the practise of
medicine or surgery is labor; and like other forms of labor it decidedly cannot
be classified as a commodity of trade or commerce, and that therefore such
services do not come within the purview of the antitrust laws.
There are dicta 25 to the same effect in several other cases; and there are
120. Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522 (1915); but see dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.,
in Duplex Printing Press v. Deering, at note 122 infra.
121. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 12 et seq. (1927).
122. 254 U. S. 443, 481 (1921): In a strong dissenting opinion BrandeL% . said "The
change in the law by which strikes once illegal and even criminal are not recognized as
lawful was effected in America largely without intervention of leglation .... This statute
(Clayton Act) was the fruit of unceasing agitation, which extended over more than twenty
years and was designed to equalize before the law the position of workingmen and em-
ployers as industrial combatants. . . . The resulting law set out certain acts which bad
previously been held unlawful whenever Courts disproved of the ends for which they were
performed; it was then declared that when those acts were committed in the coure of an
industrial dispute, they would not be held to violate any law of the United States."
123. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1921); United Leather
Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457 (1924).
124. 140 Iowa 182, 184, 118 N. W. 276, 277 (1908). The court said: "The primary
inquiry is: Are the charges of a physician or surgeon for his medical sll or ability an
article of merchandise or commodity to be produced or sold in this state? . . . the word
'commodity', when used with reference to prices, should not be held to include labor ....
That the practice of medicine and surgery is labor no one, we think will question. . . .
See Comment (1938) 7 FoRmHu L. Rav. 217, 226, which points out that since "labor"
has been held to include both mental and physical activity, education might conceivably
be placed under the comprehensive terms of "labor", and thus come under Federal regula-
tion, if the proposed Child Labor amendment were ratified by the requisite number of
states.
125. Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammerstein, 162 App. Div. 691, 695, 147 N. Y. Supp.
532, 535 (1st Dep't 1914), aff'd 221 N. Y. 507, 116 N. E. 1051 (1917). The court said, "If
the production of opera is trade and commerce, it would seem to follow that every
museum which exhibits pictures . . . every lawyer who prepares a brief, every surgeon
who performs an operation ... is engaged in commerce. In the construction of statutes the
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numerous cases where, by analogy we must arrive at the same conclusion. In
fact, if we use a "rule of reason" to analyze medical services, we cannot by
any conceivable stretch of the imagination arrive at any other conclusion than
that of Rohlf v. Kasemeier-that whether labor or service is skilled or un-
skilled, manual or intellectual, it cannot be classified as a "commodity": nor
can it be held as an article of "trade" or "commerce" and therefore does not
come within the purview of the antitrust laws.
Furthermore, Sec. 17 of the Clayton Act, as we have seen, gives non-profit
organizations of labor the right to combine for mutual help, and to lawfully
carry out the legitimate objects of such organization. If, therefore, we admit
that labor, whether skilled or unskilled, intellectual or manual, has the right
to organize, can we on the one hand admit this right, and then, on the other
hand state, as Mr. Arnold does, so illogically, that this same lawful organization
violates the antitrust laws?1 26 This would seem to be a reductio ad absurdern.
Finally, Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act states that the combination must be
interstate in operation. For that matter, all the Federal antitrust laws, i. e.
the Sherman, Clayton and Hepburn Acts relate exclusively to interstate com-
merce, and leave intrastate violations to the States themselves.
As far as the antitrust violations in the District of Columbia are concerned,
they are specifically taken care of by Sec. 3 of the Sherman Act, which states
that trusts in the territories of the United States or in the District of Columbia
are illegal, and that combinations in restraint of trade are a misdemeanor.
Hence the determination of illegality in Washington, would follow the Federal
rule which we have already examined.
Is the practise of medicine and surgery interstate in its scope? To merely
mention this question would seem to be sufficient to drop it from consideration.
When a doctor examines a patient in his office, or goes to the patient's home,
or operates on his patient at his office, or at the hospital, can we possibly
make an interstate act out of this? It may be argued that the doctor some-
usual and natural meaning is to be given to words and it can scarcely be urged that a
construction which would include the above in 'trade or commerce' would give to the words
their usual and natural meaning."
In Harelson v. Tyler, 281 Mo. 383, 393, 219 S. W. 908, 913 (1920), the court said "
labor, whether physical, or intellectual, or a combination of the two, is not by any fair
rule of construction a 'product or commodity' . . . within the meaning of the word as
used in the statute. ... 
In Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 655 (1895), the court held that personal effort,
not related to production was not a subject of commerce. In Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore v. National League etc., 259 U. S. 200, 209 (1922) the court said, " . . . A
firm of lawyers sending out a lawyer to argue a case, or the Chautauqua lecture bureau
sending out lecturers, does not engage in such commerce because the lawyer or lecturer
goes to another State. . .. .
126. In National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders Ass'n, 169 Fed. 259, 265 (C. C. A.
2d, 1909), the court stated, "The direct object or purpose of a combination furnishes the
primary test of its legality. It is not every injury inflicted upon third persons in Its
operation that renders a combination unlawful ...a combination entered into merely for
the purpose of promoting by lawful means the common interests of its members is not a
conspiracy. .. "
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times travels to treat a patient in another state; or that a patient travels from
another state to see the doctor for examination and treatment; or that a
prescription is given which may be filled in another state. Are not these acts
of travel interstate in character? It is indeed true that they may so be, but
the travelling from one state to another is merely incidental to the act of
treatment which is always local.
Thus, in the Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 17 the Supreme
Court held that the necessary travelling of the baseball players from one state
to another was merely incidental to the baseball exhibition which is purely a
local matter.
Similarly, in Metropolitai Opera Company v. Hatninerstei,12 85 the Court
stated that the travelling of the actors from one state to another, and even
the transportation of scenery and other necessary effects were but incidental
to the rendition of the operatic performances; but that the performances them-
selves were strictly local in character.
We have seen, therefore, that medical service is neither a commodity of
trade nor commerce; and that it is not interstate in character. We have also
found that restraints of trade when found in interstate commerce must be direct
and immediate, rather than indirect, remote, or incidental;---so that if we
could classify the acts referred to by Arnold as restraints, they would surely
be remote and incidental.129
Finally, we have found that the Clayton Act expressly gives labor the right
to organize for the legitimate protection of its interests, and elsewhere in this
article we found that physicians, as members of a society or association, under
proper circumstances have the right to censure, suspend or expel members for
violations of rules of their organization.
127. See Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 2(20, 203 (1921); Hoopr
v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 655 (1895).
128. Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammerstein, 162 App. Div. 691, 696, 147 N. Y. Supp.
532, 535 (1st Dep't 1914), aff'd, 221 N. Y. 507, 116 N. E. 1061 (1917). The court holds:
"'The decisions are numerous that where the business or thing directly affected by the
contracts are not matters of interstate commerce, the mere fact that incidentally in
preparation therefor, or as a result thereof, or in some other collateral or incidental manner,
acts o1 transactions of an interstate commercial character take place does not bring the
case within the purview of the act. ' But see H. B. Marienell v. United Booking etc, 227
Fed. 165 (S. D. N. Y. 1914) which tries to distinguish its contrary holding in rather
imilar facts, from the previous case.
129. See note 128, supra; also Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 263
U. S. 64, 80 (1925) which compares its facts with those of Coronado Coal, and United
Leather Workers v. Herkert case, and arrives at a similar holding, namely, that there is a
vdtal difference under the Sherman Act between a direct, substantial and intentional inter-
ference with interstate commerce, and an interference which is incidental, indirect, remote,
and outside the purpose of those causing it.
In Lipson v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 76 F. (2d) 213, 218 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935) the
court says, "The act was not intended to reach every remote lessening of competition, but
only such acts as would probably substantially lessen competition, or d&close an actual
tendency to create a monopoly in interstate commerce." Accord: Standard Fashion v.
Magrane Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 357 (1922); B. S. Pearsall Butler Co. v. Fed. Trade
Comm., 292 Fed. 720 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923).
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CONCLUSION.
1. The Group Health Association, as a corporation is offering to its mem-
bers all forms of medical and surgical treatment, rendered by physicians in its
employ. Despite the fact that Justice Bailey, in a declaratory judgment, has
recently decided that this corporation is not practising medicine illegally, the
weight of legal authority seems to be against his holding.
2. Under the Clayton Act, labor is expressly given the right to organize
for the mutual help and benefit of its members, and such combinations are
not be considered as violative of any antitrust laws.
Similarly, under general rules of law governing associations, unions, corporate
and unincorporated societies, individuals may unite to promote and protect
their own interests, provided that the purposes of the organization are legiti-
mate and reasonable, and do not contravene public policy. They may make
rules and regulations both as to admission of new members, and as to censure,
suspension or dismissal of members who violate any society rules and regula-
tions. If a member is given ample notice of the charges to be preferred against
him, if he is fairly tried on those charges, and if the charges themselves are not
against public policy, the courts of the nation cofisistently refuse to interfere
with the judgment rendered thereon.
Hence, when the Medical Society of the District of Columbia dismissed one
or more of its members for violating its rules and regulations, or for violating
the rules and regulations of the parent organization-the American Medical
Association, such dismissal was a reasonable and lawful exercise of society
function. Since this exercise of society function is sanctioned by the courts,
and permitted under the Clayton Act, it is difficult to understand under what
theory of the law Arnold, or the Department of Justice, can now deem these
societies to be guilty of violation of our antitrust laws.
3. Both under the Clayton Act, and by force of stare decisis, it has almost
uniformly been held that labor does not come within the purview of the anti-
trust laws. The practice of medicine, or the rendition of medical service is
unquestionably mental or intellectual labor. It has never been classified as a
commodity of trade or commerce so far as the writer has been able to deter-
mine. Furthermore, the rendition of services is strictly local rather than inter-
state in its character.
If therefore, the views of our higher courts were to change suddenly, and
an adverse opinion were to be rendered, in accordance with the beliefs of the
Department of Justice, then we would be obliged to change all our previous
concepts and notions concerning antitrust laws, and retrogress to the days
of the strict Common Law views on the subject. The likelihood of such
dramatic change in judicial outlook seems rather remote, without further legis-
lative intervention.
Joseph Rosenheck, M.D.t
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